Posts

What We Mean By Security Culture

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Ted has been writing about security culture for a while now. A recent news item seemed to me to be a great analogy for what he means. This post describes that analogy. Recently US SecDef Pete Hegseth's party was scolded by the sentry at the Tomb of the Unknowns ( article here ). Put another way, a  low ranking member of the US military felt empowered to scold a group in public, in front of reporter, for their bad behavior, even though that group included the highest ranking person in the military barring the president. That is a culture of military discipline which is truly remarkable. Can you imagine one of your organization's least senior members calling out a lack of discipline and decorum on the part of one of your organization's most senior members? (One cannot help but wonder how recent events at Nvidia would have played out if their culture had supported subordinates calling out the CEO's indiscretions. Ted's thoughts on that here .) The US military showed a...

AI As Insider Threat

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In a previous post I pointed out that having lots of AI agents helping your people crosses the line from a tool to help programmers over to a kind of assistant in need of supervision. In a recent post Ted encouraged you to consider wayward executive behavior as an insider threat. Let's take that progression a step further: a kind of assistant which has enough autonomy to act meaningfully requires the same scrutiny that a human employee requires. When we talk about insider threats we mean scrutiny to assess the following risks: Accidents Negligence Malice The more you embrace agentic AI the more of an insider it becomes. The more of an insider it becomes the more you must guard against the risk of it being an insider threat. Let's consider how agentic AI might turn out be each of the three kinds of insider threat. Accidents Where to start? Agentic AI is quite accident-prone, by which I meant that agentic AI does things which are not what you want and not what you expect. That ...

Is Your Company's HR System Or Its CEO The New "Insider Threat"?

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We have published several times this year about insider threats. As a recap, insider threats are people with authorization to be on your system who nevertheless create vulnerabilities through some combination of negligence , ineptitude , malice , or moral hazard . There have always been insider threats. As long as you have some digital asset -- IP, data, compute, secrets, crypto -- that someone else wants, the threat exists that someone with authorized access to your systems will misdirect it. Recent events may lead us to expand the notion of insider threat in two ways. We invite cybersecurity leaders to think strategically about broader attack surfaces, especially ones where the vectors are novel and are not lower- or mid-level employees. Before we continue: nothing here implies that any nationality or gender is more likely to be a threat or a target. We are asking you to think more broadly about insider threat than stereotypes or your usual processes. First, maybe it's not solely...

Who's Job Is "Bug-Fixing"?

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A recent report from Alex Banks at The Signal caught our attention: "AI has made finding security holes cheap, but fixing them still needs people. Every fix has to be checked and released by the people who look after the software, so of those 948 bugs which GPT-6 Cyber found, only 61 had been fixed by the end of the 10-day test. It’s great that we’re speeding up in this domain, and to contextualise this, cybersecurity researcher Dave Aitel reckons a skilled human hacker might find 30 bugs like these in a whole career." Wow. Finding bugs is now cheap. "Fixing them still takes people": first the maintainers who review and release, then your team, who has to test and deploy. Both steps run on human coordination. That's the point of the four pillars of a successful cybersecurity team : hire for talent, build structure, create engagement, develop your people. These pillars let you create a security culture, and in turn the security culture provides the rationale for...

You Do Not Need "Ongoing Recruitment" If You Have A Talent-Based Assessment System

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Presumably you know details about your recruiting cycle -- when it starts (if there is a "recruiting season"), steps in posting job announcements, advertising on job boards, engagement with HR, etc. Does your recruiting cycle end? If you have an "ongoing recruitment" cycle, why is that? Most clients we work with actively "recruit talent" on an ongoing basis because, well, that's how they do things. When nudged they will say it's because you just never know when The Best Candidate will be available, or they will need to be "agile" under changing work conditions, etc. But to your candidates, especially the best ones, "ongoing recruitment" is a turn-off. It sets up people to feel 'ghosted' when they apply and never hear back from you -- which on your end has a rationale such as "we were training our AI" or "we wanted to see what the market looked like" or "we were overwhelmed with candidates and did...

Happy Veterans Day And Remembrance Day

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Thank you to all veterans, not just for your service but for your sacrifices. (image credit: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Papaver_Rhoeas_Far-gh_01.jpg">Far-gh</a>, <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0">CC BY-SA 4.0</a>, via Wikimedia Commons)

She Says Tomato, You Say Solanum lycopersicum, I Say Talent

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When you think of what a new cyber-defender would do, you think in terms of tasks: check logs, update software, review procedures, etc.* Consider that this task-based thinking limits your team's performance: you need to think in terms of competencies. Make sure you're using the right competencies.  A reliable source, ONETONLINE.ORG, is here to help. A search through ONET for "cybersecurity" identified 20 occupations that touch on cybersecurity even if tangentially. Two should catch your attention: Information Security Analysts (occupation # 15-1212.00) and  Information Security Engineers (occupation # 15-1299.05). These occupational descriptions are excellent for a basic, entry-level cyber-defender job description though they reflect industry averages. Small and new operations could start understanding the role better at an entry level by starting here. But. You may not be tracking that the US government, as per Executive Order 13434, directs federal agencies and t...