Is Your Company's HR System Or Its CEO The New "Insider Threat"?
We have published several times this year about insider threats. As a recap, insider threats are people with authorization to be on your system who nevertheless create vulnerabilities through some combination of negligence, ineptitude, malice, or moral hazard.
There have always been insider threats. As long as you have some digital asset -- IP, data, compute, secrets, crypto -- that someone else wants, the threat exists that someone with authorized access to your systems will misdirect it.
Recent events may lead us to expand the notion of insider threat in two ways. We invite cybersecurity leaders to think strategically about broader attack surfaces, especially ones where the vectors are novel and are not lower- or mid-level employees.
Before we continue: nothing here implies that any nationality or gender is more likely to be a threat or a target. We are asking you to think more broadly about insider threat than stereotypes or your usual processes.
First, maybe it's not solely insiders, as in full-time employees or contractors, who are threats. Think bigger: maybe your company's hiring funnel or its entire human capital system is an attack surface:
- We love this piece from Sophos about the attack they encountered. The lure was a GitHub “coding assignment” opened in VS Code, which ran a hidden command and installed malware within two minutes. An industry partner alerted Sophos, which then found the employee’s endpoint agent was broken. Sophos lived to laugh about it, but they also were lucky.
- In the KnowBe4 attack from 2024, a North Korean operative using a stolen US identity and an AI-enhanced photo passed interviews and background checks and was hired. The company shipped a laptop to a “mule laptop farm” address, and malware loaded immediately. KnowBe4’s endpoint detection raised an alert, the SOC contained the laptop within about half an hour, and no data were reported lost.
- The most recent attack was on Binance (see the Litany of the Hacked from October 2026). A current, i.e. full-time, Binance engineer was approached by a gang (attributed by the FBI to be connected to the government of North Korea, which denied its involvement) that claimed to be a legitimate recruiter through a legitimate job site. After two interviews the engineer was asked to download a coding assignment onto his work computer. It was laced with malware that escaped Binance’s security software. Weeks later, the attackers used that foothold to reach the service that approves transfers and moved about $6.3 billion in crypto.
Don't even get us started on "synthetic job candidates."
Second, maybe it's not negligence per se that's the threat vector. Think bigger: maybe foreign intelligence assets who target C-Suite executives, as alleged in official government intelligence reports, turn the insider unwittingly into what you would otherwise consider to be the threat.
We've written previously about leading in the 'always-on' SOC. Expanded conceptualization of insider threat as a strategic issue rather than a nuisance to be handled by the security department or by HR creates a vision of security culture that is resilient within the multi-threat environment.
Risk surfaces are expanding both due to technology and the breadth of interconnectivity. Have you carefully evaluated your evolving contingencies?
Ask us how you can prepare your cyber-operations for resilience in the multi-threat environment.
(image credit: Qwexcxewq, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

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